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In the publishing industry, the publishers 
supply products like the magazines, 
newspapers and books to the retailers. In order 
to encourage the retailers to order more, the 
publishers usually adopt a kind of buy-back 
return policies under which the retailers can 
return the unsold products for a partial refund. 
In the past, due to the lack of retail sales 
channel, most of the returned products were 
salvaged at a very low value. Now, with the 
advance of e-commerce, publishers can make 
use of Internet as an e-marketplace to sell 
those returned products to a completely 
different market –  the World Wide Web. Since 
Internet offers a global open system, it breaks 
the geographical barrier and the demand for 
those “locally fade-out” goods can be very 
significant. In light of this, we study in this 
paper a two-echelon supply chain with one 
publisher and multiple retailers. Through the 
simulation analysis, we find that the impact of 
the e-marketplace can be substantial. 
Depending on the operations cost of the e-
marketplace and the size of the demand, the 
expected profit improvements for the publisher, 
the retailers and the overall supply chain vary. 
We identify the factors that can achieve the 
situation under which all parties' profits are 
improved with the e-marketplace. Moreover, 
with a price dependent demand distribution for 
the e-marketplace, we can determine the 
optimal buy-back price and the optimal e-
marketplace selling price for the product.  A 
real case of a local publisher has been chosen 
for simulation analysis and the managerial 





We are now in the information age. With a 
continuous decrease in prices of computers and 
Internet access services, going online is not a 
luxurious activity anymore. With the 
popularity of Internet and the growing 
confidence about the reliability and security of 
the network, e-commerce has a bright future. 
Nowadays, companies can contact their 
customers and business partners, place orders 
and finish transactions anywhere via Internet. 
From a supply chain operational perspective, it 
is generally believed that Internet can help 
improve the supply chain’s efficiency. In fact, 
one of the proposal is to use Internet to solve 
the channel coordination problem in supply 
chain management (e.g. achieving the virtual 
vertical integration).  
 
With the practical importance of Internet, 
many articles have appeared in recent supply 
chain management literature. Let us share and 
review some of them now. First, in [8], many 
applications of Internet for supply chain 
management have been identified. The authors 
start the discussion with a review of Internet's 
features and its role in the supply chain 
management. They mention the issues of 
efficient information flow, virtual integration 
and strategic gaming among members of the 
supply chain. They then discuss the direct sales 
and the e-marketplace sales channels via 
Internet.  For the e-marketplace, they find that 
the aggregation of buyers and sellers on the e-
marketplace can lead to lower transaction costs 
and a more efficient market information flow. 
It also facilitates B2B transaction. Moreover, 
in inventory management, manufacturers can 
also buy inventory from other suppliers and 
sell the excess capacity or inventory via the e-
marketplace. Besides e-marketplace, the 
applications of auctions and bidding on 
Internet with industrial examples and figures 
are outlined. In fact, [8] gives us an insightful 
overview for many issues which builds the 
conceptual framework for further quantitative 
analysis of supply chain management with 
Internet. 
 
The potential applications of Operations 
Research (OR) techniques in the e-marketplace 
and Internet enabled supply chain systems are 
proposed in [15]. The author has mentioned 
the technological issues of the e-marketplace 
and the OR opportunities there. In his analysis, 
the firm’s planning horizon is separated into 
four categories: Long term, medium term, 
short term and immediate. For each category, 
he describes the corresponding business 
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drivers and suggest the possibilities for 
applying OR skills to deal with each one of 
them. He believes that the supply chains with 
Internet and the e-marketplaces can let 
companies get additional benefits by using OR. 
This paper provides us a lot of information 
about how to apply OR methods, together with 
Information Technology, for solving real-life 
problems.  
 
In the earlier time, the idea of frictionless 
competition on Internet is investigated in [1]. 
The authors have made a comparison between 
the conventional retailers and the e-tailers. 
They carried out empirical studies towards the 
price adjustment and dispersion of the e-tailers 
and conventional store retailers of CDs and 
books. They conclude by saying that although 
internet competition exhibits lower friction, 
attributes like branding, trust and awareness 
exist and differentiate different e-tailers from 
one another. Other interesting e-commerce 
related articles for operations management 
include [4], [5] and [7]. 
 
In this paper, instead of proposing a conceptual 
framework, we formulate a quantitative model 
and provide a simulation analysis about the use 
of e-marketplace for selling returned products 
in the publishing industry. We consider a two-
echelon supply chain with a single publisher 
who supplies the products to multiple retailers. 
It is a usual practice in the publishing industry 
that the publisher will adopt a buy-back return 
policy. Under this buy-back policy, the 
retailers can return the excessive orders (i.e. 
the unsold products at the end of the season) to 
the publisher for a partial refund. This type of 
policy with different extensions has been 
widely studied in the literature ([2], [3], [6], 
[10], [11], [13] and [16]). Notice that the first 
well-recognized quantitative analysis of buy-
back contract appears in the marketing science 
literature by Pasternack [13]. Back to the 
discussion of the return policy in the 
publishing industry, under the original practice, 
the publisher uses a buy-back policy to attract 
the retailers to order more while the returned 
products (from the retailers) usually worth 
very little to the publisher (e.g. just the value 
of the paper for recycling). Now, with the 
advance of e-commerce, we propose that the 
publisher can sell the returned products at a 
nicer price (higher than the salvage value) on 
the e-marketplace. In this paper, we look into 
this issue and through simulation analysis, we 
first determine the optimal buy-back price in 
the absence of the e-marketplace. Then, we 
will find the optimal buy-back price and the 
optimal selling price of the returned products 
in the e-marketplace. After that, we study the 
impacts brought by the e-marketplace to the 
publisher, the retailers and the overall supply 
chain. Numerical  analysis  is carried out and 
managerial insights are then developed.  
 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as 
follows: We first propose the basic model and 
then we derive the mathematical details for all 
the parties in the supply chain. Afterwards, a 
real case is studied and simulation analysis for 
the supply chain with and without the e-
marketplace is done. Numerical  analysis 
towards the parameters of the e-marketplace is 
carried out, too. Finally, we conclude with a 





In this paper, we propose a two-echelon supply 
chain for a certain publishing business. We 
consider a publisher who supplies a single 
product to multiple retailers. This product can 
be a magazine, a journal or a book, etc. The 
normal selling season of this product is short. 
For example, for the bi-weekly magazine, its 
normal selling season is just about two weeks. 
At the end of the selling season, the retailers 
can return the unsold products to the publisher 
following a buy-back return policy. To be 
specific, this return policy states that the 
unsold products can be returned to the 
publisher for a partial refund with a unit buy-
back price b. For example, suppose a publisher 
sells the products to the retailers with a unit 
wholesale price of $100 and set the unit buy-
back price to be $40. Then after the selling 
season, the retailers can return the unsold 
products to the publisher and the publisher will 
pay $40 for each returned product. In this 
paper, we only consider a flat rate of buy-back 
price, i.e. the buy-back price is fixed and it 
does not depend on the returned and order 
quantities. Moreover, owing to the legal issue 
of fairness, the unit buy-back price b offered 
by the publisher must be the same for all 
retailers (see [16]). In the old practice without 
the e-marketplace, the publisher would salvage 
the returned products at a unit salvage price v. 
Now, with Internet, the publisher can consider 
selling the returned products with a nicer price 
(higher than the salvage price) through Internet. 
This is an example of using Internet as a 
market place for excess products as mentioned 
in [8].  
 
Now, for the product’s cost and revenue 
structure, we assume that the product has a 
fixed market retail selling price r for all 
retailers during the normal selling season. 
Examples of this type of products include 
magazines, newspapers, journals, standard 
priced books, etc with which the publisher sets 
a recommended price. For the retailers, the 
unit ordering cost of the product from the 
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publisher is c. Following the buy-back return 
policy, the unsold product can be returned to 
the publisher at a unit price b at the end of the 
selling season. The unsold product also incurs 
a unit holding cost h. In the inventory literature, 
the unit holding cost (per unit time period) is 
taken to be a product of the unit ordering cost c 
and a constant accounting factor I , where 
10 ≤< I . For simplicity, we assume I  to be 
fixed and every retailer has a unit holding cost 
h. For the publisher, the production cost is m 
per item. After the retailers have returned the 
unsold products, the publisher can sell them to 
the salvage market at a unit price of v. Since 
the wholesale price of the product is c and the 
salvage value is v, the buy-back price under 
our consideration lies between them: cbv <≤ . 
Besides salvaging the returned products at a 
low salvage value, the publisher can also 
consider selling these products in the e-
marketplace with a unit selling price of EMPr . 
Obviously, we have vr EMP>  or else it is 
unwise to sell through the e-marketplace. By 
the way, if the publisher chooses to sell the 
returned products through the e-marketplace 
and some products cannot be sold finally, it 
will incur an additional unit holding cost of 
EMPh  but it can still be sold to the salvage 
market. Moreover, in order to use and establish 
the e-marketplace, the publisher needs to pay a 
fixed operational cost of EMPC . In this paper, 
there are n retailers and 1 publisher (the sole 
supplier of the product). During the normal 
selling season, the market demand for the 
product faced by retailer i is called ix . The 
probability density function (pdf) and the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) for ix  
are represented by )( ii xg  and )( ii xG , 
respectively. In this paper, these distributions 
are assumed to be independent of one another 
and we assume them to be normal 
distributions, i.e.,  
),(~ 2iii Nx σµ .    (1)  
Moreover, we represent the standard normal 
pdf and cdf by )(⋅φ  and )(⋅Φ , respectively. 
The inverse function of )(⋅Φ  is denoted by 
)(1 ⋅Φ − . 
 
After the normal retail selling season, if the 
publisher uses the e-marketplace for selling the 
returned products, the corresponding market 
demand is called EMPx . Since EMPx  obviously 
depends on the selling price of the product in 
the e-marketplace ( EMPr ), we treat it as a price 
dependent variable with the following 
structure: When EMPr  is well-bounded, 
EMPEMPEMP rrr ≤≤ , the distribution of EMPx  is 
as follows: 
EMPx  = EMPEMP KrK ε++− 21 ,  (2) 
where 21 , KK  are positive constants and EMPε  
is a random variable distributed as a normal 
distribution with zero mean and constant 
variance: 
),0(~ 2EMPEMP N σε . (3) 
Notice that the above demand distribution 
follows the well-known linear price dependent 
demand distribution model in the literature 
(see [9]). Observe that the product under our 
consideration has a fixed retail price in the 
retail market during the normal selling season. 
Thus, we do not explicitly formulate a price 
dependent demand distribution for the retail 
demand ix . 
 
Moreover, notice that in this model, we 
assume that the existence of the e-marketplace 
for the returned products does not affect the 
original retail market. The reasons for that 
include:  
1. From the time the products are returned 
from the retailers to the publisher, it 
already takes a relatively long time. For 
instance, for a monthly magazine, suppose 
it appears in the retail shop on Day 1. 
After the normal selling season of a month 
(and probably 1 or 2 weeks more), the 
retailers will call the publisher to pick up 
the unsold magazines. However, the 
publisher may only pick them up during 
the time when his truck visits the retailer 
for new product’s delivery (i.e. at the end 
of the month). After picking up and 
collecting all the returned products from 
the retailers, the publisher can then decide 
the other related operations issues for 
selling the magazines through the e-
marketplace. So, in this example, the 
returned magazine will be available in the 
e-marketplace after two months from Day 
1. So, consumers who can buy and want to 
buy the magazine during the normal 
selling season is unlikely to wait that long 
for the magazine. 
2. Notice that the purchase of the “fade-out” 
products in the e-marketplace incurs an 
explicit delivery cost.  For the consumers, 
they may have to pay the delivery cost of 
the products. Thus, the overall expenses 
for buying the products through the e-
marketplace are not necessarily lower than 
the retail selling prices of the products 
during the normal selling season. In this 
case, the shift of the market demand due 
to the existence of the e-marketplace for 
the returned goods is insignificant. 
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3. The product under our investigation is a 
short-life product, most of the consumers 
in its retail market are not interested about 
it after the normal selling season. For 
example, for the weekly fashion magazine, 
most of us are only interested in buying 
the latest issue and not the old ones. 
However, the returned products may have 
values to people overseas or people who 
cannot buy the products at the first 
instance (e.g. due to the geographical 
barrier). Since e-marketplace is open to 
everywhere, the demand for the product in 
a global sense can be substantial.   
 
With all these details, Figure 1 shows the basic 
model of the problem. The sequence of the 
events in Figure 1 are numbered and they are: 
First, the publisher supplies the product to the 
retailers. After the normal selling season, the 
products leftover are then returned to the 
publisher. Next, the publisher sells the returned 
product through the e-marketplace (EMP). 
After the end of the sales via the e-marketplace 
(EMP), any unsold products are salvaged. 
Notice that in Figure 1 and the rest of this 





Figure 1: The basic supply chain model with 
the e-marketplace. 
 
In the next section, we will present the 
mathematical details of the single-publisher 






We first derive the profit expressions for the 
retailer and the publisher. Here we have 
multiple retailers and we call them Retailers 1, 
2, …, n , respectively. We denote order 
quantity and the corresponding profit for 
Retailer i (i = 1, 2, …, n ) by iretailq ,  and 
)( ,, iretailiretail qp , respectively. When the buy-
back price b is given, the profit for Retailer i 
with order quantity iretailq ,  is as shown below: 
)( ,, iretailiretail qp  
= iretailiiretail cqxqr ,, ),min( −  
 ),0max()( , iiretail xqhb −−+  
 = iretailqcr ,)( −  
 ),0max()( , iiretail xqbhr −−+− ,   (4) 
where the second equality is obtained by using 
the relationship of ),(min ,, iretailiretail xq  
),0(max ,,, iretailiretailiretail xqq −−= . Taking 
expectation of (4) with respect to ix , the 
expected profit becomes, 
)(, iiretail qEP  
= iretailqcr ,)( −      
       )},0{max()( , iiretail xqEbhr −−+−  
= iretaili qbhcbhr ,)()( −+−−+ µ  
       ]/)[()( , iiiretaili qbhr σµσ −Ψ−+− ,    (5) 
where )(⋅Ψ  is the right linear loss function for 





tdyty )()()( .  (6) 
On the other hand, for Retailer i with order 
quantity iretailq , , we denote the product left-
over at the end of the selling season by 
)( ,, iretailiretail qL . The expected product left-over 
at the end of the selling season with order 
quantity iretailq , can be derived to be the 
following: 
)( ,, iretailiretail qEL  
]./)[(][ ,, iiiretailiiiretail qq σµσµ −Ψ+−=      (7) 
By checking the second order derivative of 
iretailEP , , we find that iretailEP ,  is a concave 
function. As a result, the order quantity * ,iretailq  
which maximizes iretailEP , can be found easily 














1σµ .    (8) 
Notice that the above result basically follows 
the classical newsvendor model. In the 
following, we derive the expected profits for 
the publisher under the case without and with 
the use of the e-marketplace. 
 
Without EMP: 
When the publisher does not sell the returned 
product on Internet, the expected profit of the 
publisher is derived to be: 















,, ).()( (9) 
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,, )(  represents the 
total expected quantity of returned products 
from the retailers back to the publisher. The 
publisher's expected profit with the retailers' 
optimal order quantities written as a function 
of b, )(* , bEP EMPPublisher − , is found by putting (8) 
into (9): 

















iretailiretail qELvb  (10) 
With (10), the optimal buy-back price for the 
publisher (when there is no EMP), * −EMPb , is 
determined by maximizing )(* , bEP EMPPublisher − : 
*




− .     (11) 
Since the buy-back price is bounded between 
the salvage value v and the product's wholesale 
price c, * −EMPb  can be found by a simple 
numerical search.  
 
With EMP: 
Similar to the case without EMP, when the 
publisher sells the returned product on Internet, 
the publisher’s profit, +EMPPublisherP , , is derived 
to be: 
















































,, )( . (12) 
Since min(X, Y) = X – max(0, X – Y), we 
have: 
+EMPPublisherP ,   









EMPEMP CSLbr −−+ )( .             (13) 
 
Taking expectations of (13) w.r.t. SL and 
EMPx , we have: 























iretail Cqmc −−+ ∑
=




EMP dxxfxSLSLG )(][)( ∫ ∞− −= .  (14b) 
In (14a), )(SLfSL is the probability density 
function for SL ; in (14b), )( EMPN xf  is the 
probability density function for EMPx  which is 
also a normal density. Observe that with EMP, 
instead of directly salvaging the returned 
products, the publis her acts like a “retailer” 
and sells on the e-marketplace and generates 
profit. Substituting the optimal Retailer i's 
order quantity into (14a) and (14b), we yield 
the publisher's expected profit in the following: 
*
, +EMPPublisherEP  
= )( * ,,, iretailiretailEMPPublisher qqEP =+ .     (15) 
With (15), since EMPr  and  b are both well-
bounded in our model formulation, the optimal 
solution pair of *EMPr  and 
*
+EMPb  can be found 
by numerical searches: 
( *EMPr ,
*
+EMPb )  
= }{maxarg * , +EMPPublisherEP .               (16) 
Notice that the expected profit expressions in 
(14) and (15) cannot be further simplified. In 
general, since we do not have a nice analytical 
closed form expression for the distribution of 
the total retail returned product quantities SL , 
we do not have a nice closed form expression 
for * , +EMPPublisherEP  as well.  In this case, instead 
of seeking for the analytical closed form 
solution, we carry out simulation experiments 
and get the optimal buy-back and the optimal 




SIMULATION ANALYSIS – A CASE 
STUDY 
 
We carry out in this section a simulation 
analysis towards a real case in Hong Kong.  A 
publisher in Hong Kong publishes a funny 
book series with the main themes about some 
popular people in Hong Kong, including the 
government officials and famous business 
merchants. The publisher publishes about 6 
funny books a year and they supply the books 
to hundreds of major retailers in Hong Kong. 
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The sales of the three most recent publications 
are 40000, 20000 and 35000 copies, 
respectively. The recommended unit retail 
selling price of the funny book is HK$25 and it 
is reported that the publisher can earn 
approximately half of all the revenue. This 
publisher has used the buy-back return policy 
to entice the retailers to order more. According 
to the previous experience, the normal selling 
season of each edition of the funny book series 
is about 1 to 2 months. After that, the retailers 
can return the books to the publisher for partial 
refund. Since the retail market is highly 
volatile and the overall demand is substantial, 
the amount of returned books is not trivial. 
(Remarks: The empirical details and some of 
the data of this case are found from the 
interview of the publisher in a local magazine 
[12]). 
 
In light of the background of this publisher, we 
would like to formulate a model for the 
publisher using the model structure we have 
presented in the previous section. From the 
information we have (Ref.: [12]), we have 
estimated that the current unit production cost 
for the book, m, is $4. The unit wholesale price 
for the magazine, c, is $16 and the publisher 
has marked the recommended unit retail 
selling price of the magazine,  r, to be $25. The 
annual holding rate I is 2% and the holding 
cost for each unsold magazine at the end of 
each month is calculated to be 12/)16$%2( ×  
=  $0.0267.  
 
Currently, the publisher supplies the magazine 
to about 400 major retailers around Hong 
Kong (and they will split the orders to other 
smaller newsvendors, etc). We categorize 
these 400 retailers into three groups: The high 
demand, medium demand and low demand 
groups, respectively. The demand distributions 
for high, medium and low demand groups are 
as shown below: 
)70,210(~ 2NxHigh , (17) 
)20,60(~ 2NxMedium , (18) 
)5,15(~ 2NxLow . (19) 
Notice that the uncertainties for all of these 
demands are the same in the sense that they 
have the same coefficient of variation: 
"standard deviation /mean" = 1/3. We also 
assume the number of retailers with high, 
medium and low demands to be 80 (20%), 240 
(60%) and 80 (20%), respectively. 
 
With all these details, we can start our 
simulation studies. During the simulation, 
demands for retailers following (17), (18) and 
(19) are randomly generated and the 
corresponding expected profits are found. All 
simulation results are obtained after running 
simulation experiments for 500 times. For the 
case with EMP, the optimal buy-back and the 
optimal EMP selling price are found with 1 
decimal place of accuracy. In Table 1, we list 
the average profits for the publisher, all the 
retailers and the supply chain with different 
values of buy-back price b under the case 
without EMP. Notice that the average profit of 
the supply chain is equal to the summation of 
the publisher's and retailers' average profits. 
Moreover, searching for the optimal buy-back 
price which maximizes the publisher's average 
profit numerically, we have: b = 11.0 and the 
corresponding average profits for the publisher, 
the retailers in total and the supply chain are 
363447, 234493 and 597940, respectively. By 
the way, if we search for the optimal buy-back 
price which maximizes the average profit of 
the supply chain, we have: b = 14.3 and the 
corresponding average profits for the publisher, 
the retailers in total and the supply chain are 
350805, 262996 and 613801, respectively  
 
Notations: 
PAP = Publisher's average profit. 
RAP = Retailers' average profit in total. 
SAP = Supply-chain's average profit. 
CAP = Change of average profit. 
%CAP = Percentage change of average profit.  
AP = Average profit. 
K = 1000 (Kilo). 
m = 0.001. 
 
Table 1: The average profits of the publisher, 
retailers and the supply chain with different 
buy-back price b when there is no EMP. 
b PAP RAP SAP 
0.01 342261 189921 532182 
1 344564 192609 537173 
2 346909 195492 542401 
3 349262 198563 547825 
4 351606 201851 553457 
5 353916 205383 559299 
6 356154 209187 565341 
7 358274 213315 571589 
8 360203 217826 578029 
9 361835 222793 584628 
10 363004 228306 591310 
11 363447 234493 597940 
12 362734 241549 604283 
13 360084 249761 609845 
14 353864 259605 613469 
15 339642 272047 611689 
15.9 295209 287934 583143 
 
Findings 1: (From Table 1)  
1. In Table 1, we can observe that when 
the buy-back price increases, the total 
retailers' average profit increases. It 
meets our intuition as the retailers can 
return their products with a nicer 
return price.  
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2. In the case without EMP, the 
publisher's optimal buy-back price 
3. (11.0) is not equal to the supply 
chain's optimal buy-back price (which 
we have found to be 14.3).  It means 
that the supply chain is not optimal 
and double marginalization occurs. 
This is due to the fact that there is no 
coordination and integration between 
the publisher and the retailers in our 
model. 
Now, we consider the use of e-marketplace. 
Following (2) and (3), suppose the e-
marketplace has the following price-dependent 
demand structure for all 2512 ≤≤ EMPr (P.S: 
Here, we only consider the values of EMPr  
which range from about 50% to 100% of the 
retail market price):  
EMPx ),(~
2
21 EMPEMP KrKN σ+− ,  (20) 
where EMPr  is the unit product's selling price 
via the e-marketplace and EMPKK σ,, 21  are 
all known constants. Moreover, notice that 
EMPr  is bounded while EMPx  is a normally 
distributed random variable which is not well-
bounded. In order to study the effect of high 
and low demand in the e-marketplace, we 
carried out simulation experiments with 
different values of these parameters while we 
have kept the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation/mean) fixed. Tables 2.1, 2.2, …, 2.6 
show the optimal buy-back price with different 
values of EMPr and the corresponding average 
profits for the publisher, the retailers and the 
supply chain. Notice that we have not included 
the fixed operations cost of the EMP in the 
simulation results.  
 
Table 2.1: With Case 1 distribution, the * +EMPb  
and the average profits for given EMPr  . 
Case 1: 
EMPx )2400,12000300(~
2+− EMPrN  
EMPr  
*
+EMPb  PAP RAP SAP 
12 13.5 452269 254436 706705 
13 13.5 457279 254436 711715 
14 13.5 461716 254436 716152 
15 13.4 465602 253464 719066 
16 13.4 468920 253464 722384 
17 13.3 471651 252512 724163 
18 13.2 473787 251577 725364 
19 13.1 475324 250661 725985 
20 13.0 476266 249761 726027 
21 12.9 476621 248878 725499 
22 12.7 476365 247156 723521 
23 12.7 475525 247156 722681 
24 12.5 474129 245489 719618 
25 12.5 472156 245489 717645 
 
Table 2.2: With Case 2 distribution, the * +EMPb  
and the average profits for given EMPr  . 
Case 2: EMPx )2000,10000250(~
2+− EMPrN  
EMPr  
*
+EMPb  PAP RAP SAP 
12 12.9 441050 248878 689928 
13 12.9 445149 248878 694027 
14 12.8 448782 248010 696792 
15 12.7 451907 247156 699063 
16 12.6 454534 246315 700849 
17 12.6 456654 246315 702969 
18 12.5 458272 245489 703761 
19 12.4 459391 244676 704067 
20 12.3 460015 243876 703891 
21 12.2 460137 243088 703225 
22 12.0 459749 241549 701298 
23 12.0 458861 241549 700410 
24 11.9 457518 240796 698314 
25 11.8 455719 240054 695773 
 
 
Table 2.3: With Case 3 distribution, the * +EMPb  
and the average profits for given EMPr  . 
Case 3: EMPx )1600,8000200(~
2+− EMPrN  
EMPr  
*
+EMPb  PAP RAP SAP 
12 12.1 428293 242313 670606 
13 12.0 431463 241549 673012 
14 11.9 434228 240796 675024 
15 11.9 436582 240796 677378 
16 11.8 438530 240054 678584 
17 11.7 440066 239324 679390 
18 11.6 441199 238605 679804 
19 11.6 441934 238605 680539 
20 11.5 442279 237896 680175 
21 11.5 442236 237896 680132 
22 11.4 441797 237196 678993 
23 11.4 440973 237196 678169 
24 11.4 439786 237196 676982 
25 11.3 438252 236507 674759 
 
Table 2.4: With Case 4 distribution, the * +EMPb  
and the average profits for given EMPr  . 
Case 4: EMPx )1200,6000150(~
2+− EMPrN  
EMPr  
*
+EMPb  PAP RAP SAP 
12 11.2 413387 235827 649214 
13 11.2 415662 235827 651489 
14 11.2 417632 235827 653459 
15 11.2 419306 235827 655133 
16 11.2 420684 235827 656511 
17 11.1 421744 235155 656899 
18 11.1 422543 235155 657698 
19 11.0 423015 234493 657508 
20 11.0 423196 234493 657689 
21 11.0 423084 234493 657577 
22 11.0 422681 234493 657174 
23 11.0 421990 234493 656483 
24 11.0 421033 234493 655526 
25 11.0 419812 234493 654305 
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Table 2.5: With Case 5 distribution, the * +EMPb  
and the average profits for given EMPr  . 
Case 5: EMPx )800,4000100(~
2+− EMPrN  
EMPr  
*
+EMPb  PAP RAP SAP 
12 11.0 396899 234493 631392 
13 11.0 398391 234493 632884 
14 11.0 399683 234493 634176 
15 11.0 400776 234493 635269 
16 11.0 401671 234493 636164 
17 11.0 402367 234493 636860 
18 11.0 402864 234493 637357 
19 11.0 403167 234493 637660 
20 11.0 403279 234493 637772 
21 11.0 403187 234493 637680 
22 11.0 402915 234493 637408 
23 11.0 402465 234493 636958 
24 11.0 401826 234493 636319 
25 11.0 401012 234493 635505 
 
 
Table 2.6: With Case 6 distribution, the * +EMPb  
and the average profits for given EMPr  . 
Case 6: EMPx )400,200050(~
2+− EMPrN  
EMPr  
*
+EMPb  PAP RAP SAP 
12 11.0 380156 234493 614649 
13 11.0 380902 234493 615395 
14 11.0 381549 234493 616042 
15 11.0 382095 234493 616588 
16 11.0 382542 234493 617035 
17 11.0 382890 234493 617383 
18 11.0 383139 234493 617632 
19 11.0 383290 234493 617783 
20 11.0 383346 234493 617839 
21 11.0 383306 234493 617799 
22 11.0 383170 234493 617663 
23 11.0 382939 234493 617432 
24 11.0 382620 234493 617113 
25 11.0 382213 234493 616706 
 
Findings 2: (From Tables 2.1  to 2.6)   
1. From Tables 2.1 to 2.6, we find that the 
optimal buy-back prices depend heavily 
on the demand size of the EMP. In Cases 
1 to 3, we have relatively large EMP 
demand and the optimal buy-back price 
with EMP is larger than the optimal buy-
back price without EMP, i.e. 
**
−+ > EMPEMP bb . In Case 4, when the EMP 
demand is in a moderate size, the optimal 
buy-back prices under the cases with and 
without EMP are very close to one another: 
**
−+ ≈ EMPEMP bb . When the EMP demand 
takes a relatively small value which occurs 
in Cases 5 and 6, the optimal buy-back 
price with EMP equals the optimal buy-
back price without EMP, ** −+ = EMPEMP bb .  
Thus, we know that with the introduction 
of the e-marketplace, the optimal buy-
back price is always larger than or at least 
equal to the optimal buy-back price 
without the e-marketplace. Moreover, the 
lower the EMP demand, the smaller the 
difference between the optimal buy-back 
prices with and without EMP. It can be 
explained by the fact that the smaller the 
EMP demand, the less amount of products 
required to satisfy it and hence the smaller 
incentive of the publisher to increase the 
buy-back price to attract the retailers to 
order more (and probably return more ). 
With the same argument, on the other 
hand, the larger the demand in the EMP, 
the larger the optimal buy-back price and 
a higher buy-back price can help the 
publisher in two ways: i. The publisher 
can entice the retailers to order more 
during the normal selling season. ii. With 
a larger buy-back price, the expected 
amount of returned products should 
increase. Since the EMP demand is large, 
the increased amount of returned products 
can be used to fulfill the potential demand 
in the EMP.  
2. On the other hand, observe that the 
findings in Findings 1 still hold in the 
cases with EMP as reflected in Tables 2.1 
to 2.6. 
 
With Tables 2.1 to 2.6, we can search for the 
optimal values of *EMPr  and 
*
+EMPb . Table 3 
summarizes the optimal buy-back price and 
EMP selling price pair for each demand case. 
Compared with the case without using the 
EMP, the percentage changes of the average 
profits when the publisher adopts the EMP are 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 3: The optimal pair: *EMPr  and 
*
+EMPb  




EMPb  PAP RAP SAP 
1 21.0 12.9 476621 248878 725499 
2 20.7 12.2 460157 243088 703245 
3 20.4 11.5 442309 237896 680205 
4 20.2 11.0 423198 234493 657691 
5 20.0 11.0 403279 234493 637772 
6 20.0 11.0 383466 234493 617959 
 
 
Table 4: The changes and the % changes of 
the average profits with the use of EMP under 
Cases 1 to 6. 
 Publisher's Retailers' Supply Chain's 
Case CAP %CAP CAP %CAP CAP %CAP 
1 113174 31.14% 14385 6.13% 127559 21.33% 
2 96710 26.61% 8595 3.67% 105305 17.61% 
3 78862 21.70% 3403 1.45% 82265 13.76% 
4 59751 16.44% 0 0.00% 59751 9.99% 
5 39832 10.96% 0 0.00% 39832 6.66% 
6 20019 5.51% 0 0.00% 20019 3.35% 
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Findings 3: (Tables 3 and 4) 
From Tables 3 and 4, we can observe that the 
average profits of the publisher, retailers in 
total and the overall supply chain all get 
improved or at least not worse than before 
after using the EMP. When the EMP demand 
is relatively large (in Cases 1 to 3), the average 
profits for the publisher, retailers and the 
supply chain all get improved. This is due to 
the increase of the optimal buy-back price. 
When the EMP demand is relatively small (in 
Cases 4 to 5), there is no improvement in terms 
of the average profit for the retailers and the 
amount of improvement for the publisher and 
also the overall supply chain will be relatively 
small. Thus, for the retailers, they can actually 
be benefited if the EMP demand is large. In 
fact, we find that the larger the EMP demand, 
the larger the improvement of the average 
profits for all parties. Moreover, when the 
fixed operations cost of the EMP is less than 
the publisher's improvement of average profit, 
the publisher should be willing to proceed. 
Notice that when the demand follows the 
distribution in Case 6, the amount of 
improvement for the publisher is only 20019, 
which is pretty small. Thus, the expected 
improvement of profit with the EMP is not 
necessarily attractive and it depends highly on 
the demand in the EMP. Since the demand on 
Internet is highly volatile, the risk of operating 
the EMP is high. As a result, unless the 
publisher is rather certain about the existence 
of a sufficiently large demand from the EMP, 
proceeding with the EMP may not be a smart 
decision. It also explains the situation that 
EMP for the publishing industry is not that 
popular in many places (e.g. in Hong Kong) 
because the EMP demand is still relatively 
small and uncertain.  
 
Next, we carry out numerical  analysis towards 
several parameters of the EMP.  Notice that 
according to (20), the EMP demand ( EMPx ) 
distributes as a normal distribution with mean 
of 21 KrK EMP +−  and variance of
2
EMPσ . We 
would like to look into the impact of the 
variation of each of the parameters for the 
distribution of EMPx . Moreover, we would also 
check about the impact of the holding cost for 
the EMP. As a control setting, we will set our 
default EMP demand to be the one used in 
Case 3 above, i.e. 
EMPx )1600,8000200(~
2+− EMPrN . Then we 
will change each of the parameters for this 
EMP demand and investigate its impact. The 
numerical results for the analysis are as shown 
in Tables 5 to 8 below. 
 
 
Table 5: Effect of the changes in 1K  to 
*
EMPr  
and *EMPb  and the corresponding average 









% CAP % CAP % CAP 
50 25 13.0 44.70% 6.51% 29.73% 
100 25 12.3 36.88% 4.00% 23.99% 
200 20.4 11.5 21.70% 1.45% 13.76% 
300 13.6 11.3 14.45% 0.86% 9.12% 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of the changes in 2K  to 
*
EMPr  
and *EMPb  and the corresponding average 









% CAP % CAP % CAP 
6K 15.4 11.2 12.35% 0.57% 7.73% 
8K 20.4 11.5 21.70% 1.45% 13.76% 
10K 25 12.1 33.66% 3.33% 21.77% 
12K 25 13.1 46.24% 6.89% 30.81% 
 
 
Table 7: Effect of the changes in EMPσ  to 
*
EMPr  and 
*
EMPb  and the corresponding 




Chain's EMPσ  *EMPr
*
EMPb  
% CAP % CAP % CAP 
400 19.9 11.0 21.97% 0.00% 13.36% 
800 20.0 11.0 21.95% 0.00% 13.34% 
1.6K 20.4 11.5 21.70% 1.45% 13.76% 
3.2K 22.5 12.4 21.53% 4.34% 14.79% 
 
 
Table 8: Effect of the changes in EMPh  to 
*
EMPr  
and *EMPb  and the corresponding average 




Chain's EMPh  *EMPr
*
EMPb  
% CAP % CAP % CAP 
2m 20.4 11.5 21.70% 1.45% 13.76% 
5m 20.4 11.5 21.70% 1.45% 13.76% 
0.01 20.4 11.5 21.69% 1.45% 13.76% 
0.1 20.3 11.5 21.62% 1.45% 13.71% 
1 20.1 11.1 20.90% 0.28% 12.81% 
 
Findings 4: (Tables 5 to 8)  
1. When 1K  increases, both 
*
EMPr  and 
*
EMPb  decrease. The average profits 
for all parties also decrease: The 
decrease of average profits is a very 
intuitive result because the larger the 
value of 1K , the smaller the mean of 
the EMP demand and it implies a 
smaller profit from the EMP for the 
publisher. Moreover, since the 
expected EMP demand is reduced, the 
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publisher need not increase the 
optimal buy-back price and it 
accounts for a loss for the retailers. 
Moreover, when 1K  increases, the 
effect of price change will become 
more prominent and it explains why 
the optimal EM P selling price 
decreases upon the increase of 1K .    
2. When 2K  increases, both 
*
EMPr  and 
*
EMPb  increase. The average profits 
for all parties also increase: 2K  is the 
constant term for the mean of the 
EMP demand. An increased 2K  
implies a larger expected EMP 
demand and it makes the optimal buy-
back price *EMPb  and all the average 
profits increase. On the other hand, 
similar to the comment we have made 
in Point 1 above, when 2K  increases, 
the relative significance of 1K  
decreases and the EMP demand is 
less sensitive to the price changes. An 
increased *EMPr  hence results. 
3. When 2EMPσ  increases, both 
*
EMPr  
and *EMPb  increase. The publisher's 
average profit is reduced while the 
retailers' average profit increases: 
Since the supply chain's average 
profit is affected by the average 
profits of the retailers and the 
publisher, the effect of increasing 
2
EMPσ  may increase or decrease the 
supply chain's average profit. This is 
an interesting finding. First of all, an 
increased 2EMPσ  implies an increased 
EMP demand uncertainty. When the 
uncertainty increases, in order to 
maximize the profit for the EMP, the 
publisher tends to hold more returned 
products (P.S: The concept of safety 
stock inventory). As a result, the 
optimal buy-back increases. An 
increased demand uncertainty also 
implies a drop in the significance of 
the mean of the demand. This gives a 
larger *EMPr . 
4. When EMPh  varies, the effect to the 
optimal solution pair of *EMPr  and 
*
EMPb  is very small. The impact for 
the average profits for all parties is 
small too. Thus, when the EMP 
holding cost EMPh  is within 
reasonable range, its effect is to all 
the parties is small. 
 
Other Discussions:  
In the system point of view, the introduction of 
the EMP in this example is beneficial (or at 
least not harmful) to the publisher, the retailers 
and also the whole supply chain when the 
profit generated is larger than the expense of 
operating the EMP for the publisher **. In fact, 
the use of EMP in the setting proposed in this 
paper can be beneficial and is never harmful to 
the retailers. Owing to the potential demand 
from the EMP, the publisher will increase the 
buy-back price offered to the retailers, when 
every other cost parameter remains constant. It 
is obvious that the higher the buy-back price, 
the higher the expected profit for the retailers. 
As a result, if the use of EMP is beneficial to 
the publisher (e.g. the net expected profit 
improvement overrides the fixed operations 
cost) and the publisher goes ahead with it, the 
retailers can also be benefited. This creates a 
win-win situation and the overall supply 
chain’s expected profit is also improved.  
 
**Remarks: We have assumed in this paper 
that the existence of EMP does not affect the 
market demand during the normal selling 
season for the retailers. Although we have 
explained about this point earlier in this paper, 
if the existence of EMP does affect the 
demands faced by the retailers, then the 
existence of EMP will give both a positive 
impact (potential increase of buy-back price 
from the publisher) and negative impact (lower 
demand) to the retailers. As a result, whether 
the retailers will get better off or not depends 






In this paper, we have proposed a quantitative 
supply chain management model for using the 
e-marketplace to sell returned products in the 
publishing industry. We illustrate the 
application of the buy-back return policy and 
through the simulation studies towards a local 
publisher's case, we discuss the managerial and 
strategic issues of using the e-marketplace. In 
our model, we find that the introduction of the 
e-marketplace can be beneficial to the retailers 
and whether the publisher and the overall 
supply chain is benefited depends on his fixed 
operations cost and the demand in the e-
marketplace. For the e-marketplace with 
moderate and large demand, we find that the 
improvement of expected profits for the 
publisher, the retailers and also the supply 
chain can be substantial. Owing to the fact that 
Internet targets at a global market without 
geographical barrier, the potential demand for 
those “locally fade-out” products can be high. 
Tsan-Ming CHOI, Duan LI, Houmin YAN   
The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19 – 21, 2001. 11 
As a result, the importance of using Internet as 
an e-marketplace for returned products should 
not be neglected and it can yield significant 
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